Essay sixteen. Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox

In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 416-456 (2009)
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10.1515/9781400833184.416

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Scott Soames
University of Southern California

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