Abstract

In recent years, a growing body of work has emerged in legal theory that focuses on the relationship between law and virtue. Part of this virtue jurisprudence literature deals with the role of virtue in adjudication and judicial decision-making, with leading authors claiming that virtue plays a central explanatory and normative role. This article engages with this literature on virtue in adjudication, and connects it with a contemporary phenomenon that poses a risk for courts and judges, namely the politicisation of judiciaries. In particular, the question emerges whether virtue jurisprudence is able to provide practical guidance to judges and courts in order to help them avert such politicisation. I sketch the outlines of two contrasting answers to this question, by exploring two alternative approaches to understanding the politicisation of judiciaries from within a broadly virtue-ethical framework. On the first approach, it appears that judges may help prevent politicisation, by becoming more attentive to the tragic character of particular cases and by deciding as civic friends. However, on the other approach, which builds on Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral discourse, politicisation appears to be intractable, and the practical recommendations following from the first perspective may even aggravate it.