Decision theory and de minimis risk

Erkenntnis:1-24 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk.

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Author's Profile

Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Unbounded Utility.Zachary Goodsell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Probability, normalcy and the right against risk imposition.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Pascalian Expectations and Explorations.Alan Hajek & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Roger Ariew & Yuval Avnur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Pascal. Wiley-Blackwell.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.

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