Abstract

The article considers a claim that scientific theories can serve as models for philosophical conceptions. It is argued that a scientific theory is modelling a metaphysical conception iff the ontology connected with the metaphysical conception is included in the ontology connected with the scientific theory. However, metaphysical and scientific ontologies may be compared only after the application of interpretative procedures that constitute 'philosophical hermeneutics'. To justify this claim, it is argued that: (1) there are ontologies connected with metaphysical conceptions, (2) there are ontologies connected with scientific theories, (3) there exist logical relations between ontologies connected with metaphysical conceptions and those connected with scientific theories, (4) these ontologies are usually incomplete and need specification by using interpretative procedures. The points (1) and (2) are justified by showing that ontological statements, i.e. statements which describe categories of objects and relations between them but disregard the extensions of terms naming the objects' categories, can be inferred from typical metaphysical and scientific statements. Accordingly, it is claimed that ontological statements connected with metaphysical conceptions and scientific theories are free from the semantic differences that prevent typical metaphysical and scientific statements from standing in logical relations to each other (assumption 3). Subsequently, a set of pragmatic decisions is described, needed to specify metaphysical and scientific ontologies up to the level that allows comparisons between them (assumption 4). Finally, the article presents the notion of modelling as a relation between scientific theories and metaphysical conceptions.