Groll on Bionormativity and the Value of Genetic Knowledge

International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 16 (1):182-192 (2023)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Groll on Bionormativity and the Value of Genetic KnowledgeBradford Skow (bio)1. IntroductionShould people who plan to use donated sperm and/or eggs to conceive a child use an open donor who agrees ahead of time that any resulting children may be told who the donor is? In Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation (Groll 2021), Daniel Groll answers yes. He argues that using an anonymous donor would be wrong. Groll does not discuss adoption in detail, but his ideas also support the claim that people who adopt a child should adopt from parents who agree ahead of time that their child may be told who their biological parents are. It is not OK to have a closed adoption, in which information about the child's biological parents that would otherwise be public (for example, information on their original birth certificate) is kept secret by the government, and where (in some cases) the biological parents are promised that their children will never learn who they are. I was adopted in a closed adoption and met my biological family when I was twenty, and I think Groll's answer to his main question is right. That, however, does not mean I agree with all of his reasons. Here I examine those reasons and sketch some places where I would depart from them.2. The argument in outlineThe basic outline of Groll's argument, in simple terms, is as follows.1. If a child's knowing who their genetic parents are will likely benefit them—that is, if it will make their life go better, or increase their wellbeing—and if this is foreseeable, then that is a reason for parents to make the child's learning this possible (at some "appropriate" time).2. That knowledge will likely benefit the child …3.. … and this is foreseeable. [End Page 182]4. This reason favoring parents making genetic knowledge possible is strong enough that, except in maybe very special circumstances, parents should make this knowledge possible.The first point is hard to dispute. If the second point is true, then the third point is also plausible, since it is foreseeable that a child born from gamete donation (or an adopted child) will likely try to learn who their genetic (or biological) parents are. These searches are common and widely known to occur. Most of the action, therefore, is in the second point. Why think that knowing who your genetic or biological parents are is likely to make your life go better? Here the path diverges into a wood.3. First try: getting what you want makes your life go betterThe simplest way to argue that knowing who your genetic parents are is a benefit is to note that many, if not most, people conceived through gamete donation (or adoption) will, at some point, want—intensely want—to know who their genetic (or biological) parents are. One can then appeal to the idea that getting what you want makes your life go better, other things being equal.1Groll does not like this justification. His objection is that it does not show "that there is anything resembling a deep connection between genetic knowledge and well-being" (Groll 2021, 65). On Groll's view, knowing who your genetic (biological) parents are is a benefit, but this is not simply because it is something you want to know. I might know ahead of time that my child will want to live in a red house, and they might therefore be better off if they get to, and I might do my best to make that possible; but the reason I have to make genetic knowledge available to them is much stronger and much weightier than my reason to help them live in the right colored house. (It may be that this is where the fourth point of the argument, about the strength of reasons, comes in.)So why is the reason to provide genetic knowledge stronger? Groll, I think, holds that some things are more worth wanting than others. Getting what you want may benefit you, but getting what you want when what you want is something...

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Bradford Skow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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