Abstract

In the present paper we argue that although the semantics of both legal and moral statements can be explained with the use of a unified framework called hybrid or quasi-expressivism (Finlay & Plunkett, 2018), there still is an important difference in the semantics of moral and legal terms. Namely, while the truth conditions of legal statements are widely intersubjectively shared, this is not the case with moral statements. We demonstrate this difference using the example of the ex aequo et bono adjudication method. In the first background section we explain what is hybrid or quasi-expressivism as well as what is the standard account of the semantics of moral and legal statements. In the next section, we explain in detail how we aim to demonstrate that the semantics of legal terms and the semantics of some moral terms, such as ‘goodness’ or ‘fairness’, differ importantly. In order to illustrate the difference, we next explain the ex aequo et bono adjudication method and provide examples of cases in which this method has been employed. Crucially, this method is extremely rarely used, which highlights the difference between the semantics of legal and moral statements. Finally, we provide our interpretation of why ex aequo et bono adjudication is so seldom employed and what consequences this has for a theory of the semantics of legal and moral terms.