- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axs047 (2013)
Abstract
Philosophers have proposed many alleged examples of non-causal explanations of particular events. I discuss several well-known examples and argue that they fail to be non-causal. 1 Questions2 Preliminaries3 Explanations That Cite Causally Inert Entities4 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws I5 Stellar Collapse6 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws II7 A Final Example8 ConclusionAuthor's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [2] (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [3] (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [4] (no proxy)
- philsci-archive.pitt.edu
(no proxy) - philsci-archive.pitt.edu [2] (no proxy)
- philsci-archive.pitt.edu [3] (no proxy)
- web.mit.edu (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations.Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
Non‐committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
Mental events as structuring causes of behavior.Fred Dretske - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Causal-explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Psychology 61 (4):303-332.
Forms of causal explanation.Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
Causal thinking and its anthropological misrepresentation.Pascal Boyer - 1992 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 22 (2):187-213.
Out of sequence communications can affect causal judgement.John Patrick, Lewis Bott, Phillip L. Morgan & Sophia L. King - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):133 - 158.
What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?Marc Lange - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):485-511.
Warum kommen "mentale Ursachen" physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht in die Quere? Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks "a verursacht b" im Umkreis moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien.Bernd Ludwig - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):169-194.
Teleological explanations and their relation to causal explanation in psychology.Elizabeth R. Valentine - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.Rob Vanderbeeken & Erik Weber - 2002 - Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59.
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-01-26
Downloads
306 (#66,369)
6 months
13 (#194,641)
2013-01-26
Downloads
306 (#66,369)
6 months
13 (#194,641)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation.Alexander Reutlinger - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):733-745.
Abstract Explanations in Science.Christopher Pincock - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):857-882.
Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation.Isaac Wilhelm - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):561-581.
References found in this work
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-64dd777598-zf4z4 uwo