Abstract
The classical theory of government and citizenship was conceived in terms of virtue and civic equality. Against this, Hobbes derived his individualistic and liberal view of citizenship from the model of the social contract, an idea that still prevails in contemporary theories of justice as fairness. Recent contractarian thought has been concerned to oppose the view that assigns priority to the welfare of groups over the rights and liberties of citizens. The author wants to question, however, whether this thought is justified in its assumption that the best way to secure liberty is to insist that the interference of social duties should be minimised and that this is the fundamental purpose of law. The classical republican tradition, centred upon the ideal of promoting civic virtue, commits citizens to engage themselves in the life of the State. The understanding of citizenship in active and participative terms presupposes public service. Freedom has to be produced, and not merely secured, by law, i.e. by giving shape to the general will of the community, acting as one body. Man, however, being irrational in civic laziness and selfish ambition, one of the goals of the law must be to prevent corruption by coercing the citizen into the performance of those civic duties upon which liberty depends.