Pluralism as a Bias Mitigation Strategy

Abstract

An agnostic pluralist approaches inquiry with the assumption that it is possible for more than one account of the phenomenon in question to be correct. A monist approaches inquiry with the assumption that only one account of the phenomenon in question is correct. The purpose of my paper is to support the claim that agnostic pluralists are less susceptible to a sort of bias that I call dialectical bias than monists.

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References found in this work

On the origin of species.Charles Darwin - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Gillian Beer.
The origin of species.Charles Darwin - 1859 - New York: Norton. Edited by Philip Appleman.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

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