Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131 (1990)
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10.2307/2108035

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Sydney Shoemaker
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Citations of this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.

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