Abstract
I begin with a brief exposition of what is positive in Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger. At the same time, I show how Haugeland subtly shifts the ground so as to make it possible to read into the texts his own idea that being is the entity-beholden, variable, normative basis for ways of life. I then argue that what Heidegger himself says about the being of available (zuhanden) entities, i.e., things of use or equipment (Zeug), doesn’t fit with Haugeland’s normativity-oriented account. I develop this argument further through a look at Heidegger’s treatment of occurrent (vorhanden) nature as he elaborates that in his reading of Kant. This allows us to see how Heidegger follows Kant in thinking of the forms of being as spontaneous but non-arbitrary creations we produce for ourselves via what Kant called imagination, which activity Heidegger takes to be the self-temporalizing of Dasein identified but only opaquely described in SZ. From there, I show how we might generalize from Heidegger’s Kant’s treatment of the occurrent to a broader account in which other regional understandings of being, including that of the available, may also be understood as emerging from our temporalizing/imaginative activity. This shows what Heidegger’s overall project of fundamental ontology looks like, and how it could be completed in a way he himself didn't, if an understanding of being is an understanding of forms not norms.