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The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229 (2005)
Abstract
Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn FAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 52 (1):16-32.
A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory: Husserl's Rejection and Revision of his Philosophy of Meaning Intentions from the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Studia Phaenomenologica 20:359-380.
Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.
References found in this work
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
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