Skill and Sensitivity to Reasons

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):669-681 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper I explore the relationship between skill and sensitivity to reasons for action. I want to know to what degree we can explain the fact that the skilled agent is very good at performing a cluster of actions within some domain in terms of the fact that the skilled agent has a refined sensitivity to the reasons for action common to the cluster. The picture is a little bit complex. While skill can be partially explained by sensitivity to reasons – a sensitivity often produced by rational practice – the skilled human agent, because imperfect, must navigate a trade-off between full sensitivity and a capacity to succeed.

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Joshua Shepherd
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Practical Structure and Moral Skill.Joshua Shepherd - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):713-732.

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References found in this work

Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind.Barbara Montero - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.

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