Abstract

The deontologist believes that I am forbidden to murder some number of innocent people, even when necessary to prevent you from murdering a greater number of innocent people. Although this claim is initially plausible, it is paradoxical when viewed against two other initially plausible claims, usually advocated by the consequentialist. The first of these is that more murders are worse than fewer. The second is that it is irrational to promote what is worse. The deontologist wants to keep all three of these claims, but cannot since they are inconsistent. Surprisingly, the paradox is an equally serious problem for the consequentialist, and indeed, for any moral position. I resolve the paradox by supplementing both the prohibition against murder and the evaluation that more murders are worse than less, and eliminating an element from the account of practical reason. The results are a novel theory of practical reason, a unification of the seemingly conflicting intuitions central to deontology and consequentialism, and a deontological theory with more plausibility than those found in the literature.