Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (1):33-47 (2015)
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Abstract

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.

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