Rosenberg, reducibility and consciousness

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 (2006)
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Abstract

Rosenberg’s general argumentative strategy in favour of panpsychism is an extension of a traditional pattern. Although his argument is complex and intricate, I think a model that is historically significant and fundamentally similar to the position Rosenberg advances might help us understand the case for panpsychism. Thus I want to begin by considering a Leibnizian argument for panpsychism

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William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 2009 - In Benedikt Schick, Edmund Runggaldier & Ludger Honnefelder (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 237-252.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
The identity of indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.

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