When justice matters

Ethics 117 (3):433-459 (2007)
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Abstract

Reasonable people disagree about what is just. Why? This itself is an item over which reasonable people disagree. Our analyses of justice (like our analyses of knowledge, free will, meaning, etc.) all have counterexamples. Why? In part, the problem lies in the nature of theorizing itself. A truism in philosophy of science: for any set of data, an infinite number of theories will fit the facts. So, even if we agree on particular cases, we still, in all likelihood, disagree on how to pull those judgments together to form a theory. Theorizing per se does not produce consensus. Why not? An argument is sound or not. So why isn’t a theory compelling to all of us, if sound, or none of us, if not?

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David Schmidtz
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

When Justice Demands Inequality.Keith Hankins & John Thrasher - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (2):172-194.

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