Abstract

Western intellectual history has seen many debates about the dignity, the goodness, the sinfulness, and the freedom of humans. As we analyze these debates, we find that most Western thinkers traditionally affirm the existence of some sort of human nature shared by all humanity. Though arguments rage over the definition of that nature, it has long been agreed that such a nature exists. In the past two centuries, however, an increasing number of writers have questioned this fundamental assumption. ;Part One of this dissertation is a survey of how Western thinkers have traditionally affirmed various views of human nature. Particular attention is paid to the growth of three intellectual trends--developmentalism, social determinism, and popular positivism. These trends eventually made it difficult to affirm that something static and innately human exists within every person. Part Two analyzes prominent authors who discuss the ultimate nature of humans in the context of twentieth century technology and totalitarian governments. Ever-expanding technology and its use by very centralized governments led authors in this period to reconsider the essential nature of humans and to reconsider the trends of developmentalism, social determinism, and popular positivism. Are we "infinitely malleable?" Are we absolutely free? Are we totally determined by our social environment? Ultimately, these questions led authors to the question: Is there a fixed human nature? ;Eleven authors of the mid-twentieth century are examined. Sartre, Skinner, Cassirer, Mumford, and Arendt dismiss the concept of human nature. Niebuhr and Solzhenitsyn strongly affirm the existence of human nature, while Orwell, Koestler, Fromm, and Lewis weakly affirm various views of human nature. Though a number of authors dismiss the term "human nature," all affirm some type of constant found throughout the human race. Sartre, for example, believes all humans are free and responsible; Skinner assumes that his laws of positive reinforcement apply to all humans; and Cassirer assumes common symbolic behavior in all humans. ;This dissertation concludes that though the concept of human nature was often dismissed or avoided in the mid-twentieth century, it is logically necessary to assume at least one constant whenever humanity is discussed. Many thinkers earlier in this century saw everything as being relative--nothing was absolute. In the context of this belief, many rejected the human nature and hoped that humanity might be able to re-create itself and reach radically new levels of happiness and harmony. But the return of the concept of human nature in the 1970s and 80s shows the maturity of a new generation of writers, who are willing to honestly face the nature of our limitations--and therefore the need for this concept