Abstract

This dissertation argues that technological modes of action implicate the human being in a temporal order which is inimical to the realization of personal integrity. The dissertation takes the modest approach to the problems posed by technology for personal integrity. We do not provide an overview of modern technology, but focus instead on the relation between ends and means in typical examples of technological action. From this in situ examination of technological action, we draw conclusions about the temporality of technological activity and its implications for the realization of personal integrity. ;The dissertation consists of two parts. First, in chapters one and two, we develop a Roycean theory of personal integrity which will provide the norm by which to judge how technology affects the realization of the person. Personal integrity, on the Roycean theory, is never an endowment, but an achievement. Its realization rests on loyalty to a cause--a cooperative responsibility for the realization of an inclusive purpose. Relations with others are essential to the realization of personal integrity. In chapter two we argue that, because personal integrity rests on taking responsibility for a purpose, the person is essentially related to time. The person himself is implicated in the realization of a cause which requires concern throughout past, present, and future. The temporal order, then, is not inherently alienating, but is the locus of personal integrity. ;Second, in chapters three and four, we develop a theory of technological action, show how it implicates man in a temporality which overvalues the present and how this temporality interferes with the realization of personal integrity. Technological action is directed by an effective technique. An effective technique consists of a set of well defined rules which, if followed correctly, will always lead to a pre-determined end. Effective techniques can direct our dealings with objects and with others. In both cases, effective techniques disburden us of concern for the realization of a purpose. Disburdened of concern, man loses touch with the present as a mediator between past and future. For technology, the present is the most important dimension of time, for it is the dimension of the real. Thus, technology shows a rancor against both history and the lived time of personal life. Finally, we argue that technological temporality interferes with the realization of personal integrity because it undercuts the opportunities to take responsibility for the realization of a cause. Realization always compromises presence. Technology surrounds us with techniques of realization which least compromise presence by the least possible reliance on concern. Loyal conduct does not overvalue the present and therefore it tends to lose its place in a technological setting. Thus, personal integrity is threatened by technological temporality.