Abstract

Identity questions might arise in dealing with someone with dissociative identity disorder (DID) who seems to exhibit several distinct personalities. They also arise in the four case studies we are asked to consider (see record 2009-18001-003). Each of these cases describes a human being who changes in such fundamental ways that it is natural to ask whether we are dealing with the same person throughout his story. These identity questions cannot be answered by learning more facts about human bodies, because the sameness of the human being is not at issue. With these questions of identity, it is not immediately obvious how to go about resolving them. My primary goal in this chapter is to get clearer on how these kinds of question can be addressed. I begin by suggesting that the questions of personal identity that arise in cases such as DID and our case studies are concerned with what I call forensic personal identity. This is the notion of personal identity that underlies important practical issues concerning moral responsibility and entitlement. After defining the notions of forensic personal identity and forensic personhood, I briefly discuss the way in which the four case studies raise questions about these concepts. Next I sketch my account of forensic personal identity, which I call the narrative self-constitution view, and show how this view can be fruitfully applied to the specific questions raised by the case studies.