Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):443-458 (2022)
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Abstract

I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways to reduce these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’.

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Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Singular Terms and Ontological Seriousness.Arthur Schipper - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):574-595.
Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism.Peter Forrest - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (1):99-110.

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”Ostrich Nominalism’ or ”Mirage Realism’?Michael Devitt - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):433-439.
A Theory of Properties.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 107-138.

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