Being for: Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism * by mark Schroeder * clarendon press, 2008. XVI + 198 pp. {pound}27.50: Summary [Book Review]

Analysis 70 (1):101-104 (2010)
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10.1093/analys/anp155

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Being for: Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism • by M ark S chroeder • C larendon P ress , 2008. XVI + 198 pp . £27.50: Summary. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):101-104.

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Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

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