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Taking actions seriously
Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24):51-60 (1995)
Abstract
Two kinds of functionalism are distinguished: intensional and extensional. The former is argued to be superior to the latter. The former is also defended against two objections independently put forth by Ned Block and John Searle.Author's Profile
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2009-01-28
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