There is no viable notion of narrow content

In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 20-34 (2007)
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Abstract

This is an attack on the very notion of narrow content. In particular, I argue against two-factor theories of mental content, Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional account of narrow content and Segal's truth-conditional account of narrow content.

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Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex

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