Ordinary Objects in the Relativistic World

Abstract

Can our ordinary conception of macroscopic objects be transposed to the framework of relativity theory? According to common sense, ordinary objects cannot undergo radical variation in shape, whereas according to a compelling and widely accepted metaphysical picture of ordinary objects’ shapes in Minkowski spacetime, they do undergo such radical variation. This problem raises doubts about the compatibility of the ordinary conception and the relativistic conception of the world. I shall propose to reconcile common sense with relativistic metaphysics by viewing ordinary objects as doublelayered compounds of matter and form. The different layers permit different perspectives on the objects, the one perspective focusing on form and the other focusing on matter. This ontology allows the conception of common sense and the conception of relativistic metaphysics to manifest different and compatible perspectives on the same objects

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects.Thomas Sattig - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):594-623.
The Naive Conception of Material Objects: A Defense.Daniel Z. Korman - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Physicalism, ordinary objects, and identity.Andrew Melnyk - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:221-235.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysical Arguments against Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):340 - 359.
Essence and modality.Edward N. Zalta - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):659-693.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-24

Downloads
43 (#368,161)

6 months
1 (#1,462,504)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Sattig
University of Tuebingen

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references