Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi

Logos and Episteme 10 (4):445-447 (2019)
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Abstract

This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.

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20690533

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10.5840/logos-episteme201910440

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Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

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Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (3):333-4.
Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.

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