Fairness in the Original Position: A Defense of John Rawls's Original Position
Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (
1993)
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Abstract
A Theory of Justice is, in large part, a justification of two principles John Rawls thinks should regulate society's basic structure. ;Rawls divides his theory of justice into two main parts. First, he argues for his interpretation of the initial choice situation. Second, Rawls argues that his principles of justice would be chosen by individuals placed in this choice situation. I focus on Rawls's argument for his interpretation of the choice position, what he calls the original position. ;I begin by examining his claim that the parties are treated fairly in the original position. Briefly, Rawls explains that he incorporates into the original position commonly shared presumptions and a harmless assumption that the parties prefer more rather than less of what he calls primary goods. Rawls reasons that the assumption is harmless because persons require primary goods whatever their conceptions of the good life. ;I argue that the assumption is harmful to individuals holding non-tradition views of the good life, and that Rawls can only claim that the assumption is harmless if he limits permissible conceptions of the good. He can limit conceptions using his later developed conception of persons. ;In his later writings Rawls conceives of persons as having two highest-order interests to realize and exercise their capacities for a sense of justice and capacities to pursue a conception of the good. Rawls can identify a set of permissible conceptions of the good using this conception of persons and the fact that persons hold sometimes conflicting conceptions of the good. Permissible conceptions of the good life respect others as having the above two highest-order interests, and respect the needs of others to secure their conceptions of the good. Rawls can now argue that the primary goods assumption is harmless to persons conceived in the above way; it is harmless to those holding permissible conceptions of the good. I further argue that Rawls can justify his conception of persons. ;Finally, I use my reformulated argument to answer Rawls's critics who object to principles of justice constraining conceptions of the good.