A Not So Fine Modal Version of Generality Relativism

Theoria 25 (2):149-161 (2010)
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Abstract

The generality relativist has been accused of holding a self-defeating thesis. Kit Fine proposed a modal version of generality relativism that tries to resist this claim. We discuss his proposal and argue that one of its formulations is self-defeating.

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04954548

DOI

10.1387/theoria.638

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Gonçalo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa

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