Group identification, joint attention, and preferences: a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a reliable motivation of group identification and since joint attention has an early emergence in development, one can consider joint attention to be a putative trigger of group identification in pre-school children. If this is on the right track, group identification, joint attention, and preferences identify a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
The Form and Function of Joint Attention within Joint Action.Michael Wilby - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):134-161.
Joint attention and common knowledge.John Campbell - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.
Joint Attention and Communication.Rory Harder - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Infants' understanding of the actions involved in joint attention.Amanda L. Woodward - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind.Naomi Eilan - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-22

Downloads
14 (#993,927)

6 months
14 (#182,887)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alessandro Salice
University College Cork

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
The essential moral self.Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):159-171.
Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
Observation, Interaction, Communication: The Role of the Second Person.Dan Zahavi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):82-103.

View all 38 references / Add more references