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Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches
In Martin Curd & Jan Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton (1998)
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Citations of this work
Pre-trial beliefs in complementary and alternative medicine: whose pre-trial belief should be considered?Kirsten Hansen & Klemens Kappel - 2012 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):15-21.
Der Rabe und der Bayesianist.Mark Siebel - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313-329.
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