Aristotle's Conception of Universality

Abstract

Against the standard interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate realist about universals, I argue that he knew of and rejected this position and that he held that universals do not exist independently of the mind, but have a mind-independent basis in relations of commensurability and causality between particulars and their attributes.

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Gregory Salmieri
University of Texas at Austin

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