The semantics of scandinavian free choice items

Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (6):737-788 (2001)
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Abstract

I present an analysis of Free Choice Items (FCIs), based on Scandinavian, where FCIs are complex and distinct from polarity sensitive items. Scandinavian FCIs are argued to have two components. One is a universal quantifying into modal contexts. The other is an operator mapping a type (s,t) expression onto itself, adjoining to the closest type t or (s,t) expression. Thus invoking Intensional Functional Application, this operator requires the presence of a modal in the scope of the universal quantifier. Facts concerning ‘essential connections’ and ‘existential import’ are accounted for by assuming that the FC determiner has the option of acting like a quantifier.

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Citations of this work

On universal Free Choice items.Paula Menéndez-Benito - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (1):33-64.
Free choiceness and non-individuation.Jacques Jayez & Lucia M. Tovena - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 71.
Force and Choice.Sam Carter - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (4):873-910.
Towards a uniform analysis of any.Robert van Rooij - 2008 - Natural Language Semantics 16 (4):297-315.

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