Abstract

This dissertation investigates issues raised by these two questions: what kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed by uses of sentences that contain proper names; and what kinds of beliefs are ordinarily on the minds of speakers when they use sentences that contain proper names? It develops a new view about the connections between beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional content, one that explicitly denies that the kinds of propositions typically expressed by uses of such sentences are the objects of the beliefs typically on the minds of the speakers who use them. ;Chapter I presents both the Millian and the description theories of proper names, and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each. ;Chapter II critically evaluates Dummett's defense of the description theory against the Modal Objection. ;Chapter III introduces Kripke's puzzle about beliefs and proper names. It shows that Kripke's puzzle is not solved by the theory of proper names recently presented by Devitt. It critically evaluates the "consistency solutions" proposed by Chisholm, Harrison, Noonan, and Over. ;Chapter IV continues the discussion of Kripke's puzzle. It critically evaluates the "inconsistency solution" proposed by Marcus. It examines a commentary on the puzzle by Lewis. Finally, it presents an "inconsistency solution" based on views suggested by the Lewis commentary. ;Chapter V compares my view about the connections between beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional content to the "naive view" and the "Russellean view." It applies my view to solve two major problems for the Millian theory of proper names