Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense

Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):287-305 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent work in contemporary compatibilist theory displays considerable sophistication and subtlety when compared with the earlier theories of classical compatibilism. Two distinct lines of thought have proved especially influential and illuminating. The first developed around the general hypothesis that moral sentiments or reactive attitudes are fundamental for understanding the nature and conditions of moral responsibility. The other important development is found in recent compatibilist accounts of rational self-control or reason responsiveness. Strictly speaking, these two lines of thought have developed independent of each other. However, in the past decade or so they have been fused together in several prominent statements of compatibilist theory. I will refer to theories that combine these two elements in this way as RS theories. RS theories face a number of familiar difficulties that relate to each of their two components. Beyond this, they also face a distinct set of problems concerning how these two main components relate or should be integrated. My concerns in this paper focus primarily on this set of problems. According to one version of RS compatibilism, the role of moral sentiments is limited to explaining what is required for holding an agent responsible. In contrast with this, the role of reason responsiveness is to explain what moral capacities are required for an agent to be responsible, one who is a legitimate or fair target of our moral sentiments. More specifically, according to this view, moral sense is not required for rational selfcontrol or reason responsiveness. There is, therefore, no requirement that the responsible agent has some capacity to feel moral sentiment. Contrary to this view, I argue that a responsible agent must be capable of holding herself and others responsible. Failing this, an agent’s powers of rational self-control will be both limited and impaired. In so far as holding responsible requires moral sense, it follows that being responsible also requires moral sense.

Similar books and articles

Identification and responsibility.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.
Moral Responsibility and Motivational Mechanisms.James D. Steadman - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):473 - 492.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
A new approach to manipulation arguments.Patrick Todd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):127-133.
Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility.Susan Wolf - 1987 - In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 46-62.
Holding others responsible.Coleen Macnamara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
515 (#36,633)

6 months
105 (#42,331)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Russell
Lund University

Citations of this work

Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
Praise as Moral Address.Daniel Telech - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7.
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Add more references