Abstract
I want to take up some of the most familiar texts in Aristotle, and I want to approach them in what I think is an Aristotelian fashion, but the conclusions I will reach are not, I think, the familiar ones. I will begin, in Section 1, with Aristotle’s conception of phusis—of nature—and lead from here into a discussion of the nature of life, which will lead us to the themes of soul and body. I will find the principle of desire to be the core of phusis, and I will produce from this analysis a doctrine of self-moving wholes which actively organize relations of opposite bodies according to a desire for self-maintenance. I will then move, in Section 2, to Aristotle’s discussion of epagoge—induction—in the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics and argue for the empirical and conceptual accuracy of his account of the development of cognitive capacities. I will conclude by showing how the logical relations which characterize a situation of knowing as described in the Posterior Analytics are precisely the relations which we will already have seen to characterize a situation of life in Section 1. This will allow us to draw the conclusion, in Section 3, that knowing is a kind of bringing to life of a situation and I will discuss the situation which best exemplifies this, and also how we should try to understand the significance of this. In general, I think that recent moves in philosophy have allowed us to appreciate for the first time the significance of Aristotle’s philosophy, and this account of Aristotle’s animative epistemology should tie in nicely with modern discussions about emergence, interpretation, and other themes. I begin, then, with the basic story of what there is in the world.