Abstract

The essay starts from the Heideggerian conception of being as a difference with a phenomenological-aleteiological character, that is, as an event of sense and of the truth of being. The author defends that it is possible to think an ontic-ontological difference with a genetic-intensive character that cannot be reduced to the previous one and is inherent in the notion of physis. Heidegger, according to the central thesis, dilutes the second in the first, offering as the only alternative a devalued understanding of genesis as ontic becoming, an alternative that links to the forgetting of being. Therefore, and despite himself, he forgets being, understood in a genetic and differential way. This forgetting is analyzed in various contexts: that of Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche, that of his interpretation of becoming and that of his assimilation of german idealism. By characterizing being as genesis, the author inserts various points of view of G. Simondon, G. Deleuze, Schelling and Hölderlin.