Abstract

The primary philosophical problem dealt with in this essay is familiar: What is the relationship between reality and thought or language? The conclusion offered is less familiar: conceptual activity cannot provide answers to these questions. Rather than being a problem that is solved by rational inquiry, it is resolved by each individual through their commitment to a characteristic way of life. I critique two important philosophical positions: Hegelian idealism, and its philosophical descendant, 'linguistic idealism,' as defended by Hilary Putnam. These philosophers attack the problem by trying to make sense of it. ;Hegel asks how it is possible for there to be any 'things'--any objects or concepts--for these necessarily make up reality. He concludes that there can only be 'things' if there is a way for distinctions to be made. The sense of the problem depends upon there being determinate 'things.' Similarly, Putnam's account begins by asking how it is possible for words and expressions to refer to 'things.' ;What makes such determination and reference possible? Hegel says it is Thought itself; Reason. He ultimately takes Reason to be completely constitutive of reality, because no 'thing' can be thought to exist apart from the activity of Reason. Similarly, Putnam says that a correct account of reference necessarily includes conceptualizing: understanding the use of words in accordance with a rational conceptual scheme. Consequently, truth can only be understood from the standpoint of our own conceptualizing capabilities, which are rational. Both views dismiss, a priori, the possibility of any 'thing' existing independent of a conceptual scheme. ;The difficulty is accounting for both the nonideal state of our current conceptual scheme, and the conscious evolution of an ideally rational conceptual scheme in history. Neither of these claims can be justified or understood without the other. After critiquing several attempts to solve this dilemma, I conclude that the status of our current conceptual scheme and our conception of ideality are objectively uncertain. Nevertheless, whenever we attempt to rationally solve the problem of the relationship between thought and reality, we necessarily take our resolution to be objective. This paradoxical result shows that our conceptual scheme or activity cannot fully determine individual existence