Synchronic Contingency and the Problem of Freedom and Foreknowledge

Faith and Philosophy 32 (1):81-96 (2015)
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Abstract

Does a free agent have the power to will otherwise even at the very moment she is making a particular free choice? That is, when one is freely making some choice at a time T, does one also have the power to refrain from so choosing at T? The diachronic account of contingency and freedom says “no,” while the synchronic account says “yes.” In this paper I first address William Hasker’s criticisms of my earlier presentation of the synchronic account, and then present an argument against the diachronic account. If successful, my arguments offer support for the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.

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07397046

DOI

10.5840/faithphil201531630

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Michael W. Rota
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

Citations of this work

Banez’s Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom.James Dominic Rooney - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):91-112.
Against Synchronic Free Will.Simon Kittle - 2022 - In Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.), The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives. New York: Routledge. pp. 176-194.

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References found in this work

Freedom and the Necessity of the Present.Michael Rota - 2012 - Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):451-465.
The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to Rota.William Hasker - 2012 - Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):466-471.

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