Reflections on the ontological status of persons

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):389-393 (2002)
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Abstract

Baker calls the view that we are essentially animals Animalism. The animalist maintains that each of us is identical with a human animal. Baker argues that if Animalism is correct, then we have ontological significance in virtue of our being human animals or organisms, but not in virtue of our being persons.

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Gary Rosenkrantz
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

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