Abstract

Harry Frankfurt has argued that acting autonomously requires the reflective endorsement of the motives which move one to action. I agree with Frankfurt's thesis as a starting point; but I believe that a richer, more textured account is needed. Several deficiencies in Frankfurt's account have been noted by critics, and there are many who challenge Frankfurt's endorsement thesis. In addition, I identify two problems with Frankfurt's account which have heretofore gone unnoticed and which, in my view, necessitate revision. ;One problem is that reflective evaluation is not required to penetrate to the agent's ends in wanting to act. In Frankfurt's own examples, reflective evaluation focuses on the action promoted by the agent's motives, and does not get to the agent's ends. I submit, however, that action and end can come apart with respect to endorsement, and that reflective evaluation which penetrates only to the action promoted by the agent's motives cannot secure autonomy. The scope of the reflective evaluation requirement must be extended to cover the agent's ends in wanting to act. Second, there are no restrictions on the basis upon which reflective evaluations may be formed. Frankfurt appeals to reflective endorsements as representative of core attitudes, but sets nothing in place to ensure this representation. To the contrary, he insists that there need be no restrictions on the formation of endorsements, that they may be formed capriciously and irresponsibly, on any or no basis. But there is no reason to think that endorsements so formed will bear any connection to core attitudes. I argue that a grounding for endorsements must be found which ensures that essential attitudes are reflected, while at the same time allowing for uniqueness in what those attitudes may be. ;I propose an account which builds on Frankfurt's insight and is responsive to these difficulties. Specifically, I propose a care-based, extended reflective endorsement account. On this account, acting autonomously requires the reflective endorsement of motives, extending both to the ends and actions promoted, grounded in what the agent cares about