Where does the akratic break take place?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346 (1980)
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10.1080/00048408012341341

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Amelie Rorty
PhD: Yale University; Last affiliation: Boston University

Citations of this work

Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
The Aesthetic Enkratic Principle.Irene Martínez Marín - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):251–268.
12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.
Weakness of will.Sarah Stroud - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.
Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.
Responsibility for self.Charles Taylor - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 281--99.

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