Abstract

The reclamation of the body in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind has been united with that of intersubjectivity in the so-called second-person perspective. The ontogenetic precedence of this view does not, however, entail disaffirmation of the competing theories, which is why it is necessary to clarify how the three can coexist in explaining different cases of mental attribution. Along with this, it has become a matter of debate whether the understanding of the facial expression of the other is in origine by direct perception or corresponds to a semiotic process. The text addresses both questions and makes a case for a primitive, non-semiotic perception of emotion in the face and body of other people. The text addresses both questions and makes a case for a primitive, non-semiotic perception of emotion in the face and body of other people, which would later be the object of a semiotization when the -originally inseparable- expression-emotion complex splits into parts as a result of the interruption of direct affective-bodily contact in adult-baby interactions.