Purely Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power: A Critique

Philosophy of Science 90 (1):129-149 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

All extant purely probabilistic measures of explanatory power satisfy the following technical condition: if Pr(E | H1) > Pr(E | H2) and Pr(E | ∼H1) < Pr(E | ∼H2), then H1’s explanatory power with respect to E is greater than H2’s explanatory power with respect to E. We argue that any measure satisfying this condition faces three serious problems—the Problem of Temporal Shallowness, the Problem of Negative Causal Interactions, and the Problem of Nonexplanations. We further argue that many such measures face a fourth problem—the Problem of Explanatory Irrelevance.

Similar books and articles

Causal Explanatory Power.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1029-1050.
Probability and the Explanatory Virtues: Figure 1.Clark Glymour - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.
Causal Explanatory Power.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy012.
The Logic of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.
Importance and Explanatory Relevance: The Case of Mathematical Explanations.Gabriel Târziu - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):393-412.
Against explanatory realism.Elanor Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):197-219.
Explanatory Abstractions.Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):817–844.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-11-22

Downloads
310 (#65,767)

6 months
90 (#51,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

William Roche
Texas Christian University
Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references