What domain integration could not be

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):696-697 (2002)
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Abstract

Carruthers argues that natural language is the medium of non-domain-specific thought in humans. The general idea is that a certain type of thinking is conducted in natural language. It’ not exactly clear, however, what type of thinking this is. I suggest two different ways of interpreting Carruthers’ thesis on this point and argue that neither of them squares well with central-process modularism

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Massive Modularity, Content Integration, and Language.Collin Rice - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):800-812.

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