Metaphysical Realism and Epistemology
Dissertation, University of Cincinnati (
1985)
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Abstract
In Chapter One it is argued that three famous epistemologies, labeled foundationalism, radical skepticism and mitigated skepticism, all presuppose metaphysical realism, or the ontological division between mind and world . Then it is argued that each of these three epistemologies is false and that metaphysical realism cannot be made comprehensible apart from one or the other of them. If this is true then it follows that truth cannot be a matter of correspondence between sentences, statements, propositions, judgments, etc. and some absolutely independent reality. This, however, leaves the author with the task in Chapter Two of developing the basics of a new epistemology--one that does not presuppose metaphysical realism, yet which allows for the possibility of a genuine truth and knowledge that are in a particular way dependent on conceptualization. The phrase "genuine truth and knowledge" is crucial because part of the task is to present a view that does not reduce truth and knowledge to mere belief by relativizing them to conceptual schemes. In Chapter Three it is argued that a unique form of metaphysical realism, which I call the objectification of ideas, is present in the philosophies of Descartes, Hume and Kant, simultaneously creating for them a need to account both for the external world and personal identity, and making them impotent to do so