Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of the conceptions of the self to be found in Wittgenstein, Hume and Buddhism and to draw comparisons between them. I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s arguments against the Cartesian model of the self find some parallels in the Pudgalavādin controversy within Buddhism, and that Hume’s rejection of the notion of the self as an abiding entity and his claim that the self is simply a bundle or collection of distinct impressions and ideas bears a certain resemblance to the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. The motivation for propounding these notions of the self clearly differs in each case but this does not detract from or affect the way in which I have attempted to draw comparisons. For the sake of clarity the paper will be divided into three sections, but the interrelation between the sections and the unity of the whole is hopefully preserved by the comparisons I have attempted to draw.