The Mirage of Immediate Factual Knowledge

Idealistic Studies 41 (3):125-133 (2011)
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Abstract

The paper argues that the idea that immediate (i.e., self-contained, supposedly cognitively unmediated) experience of itself suffices to provide for “evident” knowledge is an illusion. The step from experiential subjectivity to objective fact always presupposes some suppositionally “taken” (rather than experientially given) linkage of an objectively trans-experiential nature. The deployment of idealistically mind-postulated resources is always needed to underwrite the step from personal experience to putatively objective knowledge.

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

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