Natural kind essentialism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):62 – 74 (2002)
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Abstract

This article explores the theory of natural kind essentialism, as developed by Putnam and Kripke. It defends the theory against certain criticisms, but also suggests that it should not be treated as universally true. Rather, it comes down to how different people use language, offering reasons why some people's idiolects might behave in an essentialist way while others behave in the contrary way, but explaining how we can all still communicate perfectly well despite this.

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Jasper Reid
King's College London

References found in this work

Natural kinds.D. H. Mellor - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (4):299-312.

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