Do we need mechanisms in the social sciences?

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2):163-184 (2007)
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Abstract

A recent movement in the social sciences and philosophy of the social sciences focuses on mechanisms as a central analytical unit. Starting from a pluralist perspective on the aims of the social sciences, I argue that there are a number of important aims to which knowledge about mechanisms—whatever their virtues relative to other aims—contributes very little at best and that investigating mechanisms is therefore a methodological strategy with fairly limited applicability. Key Words: social science • mechanisms • explanation • critical realism • methodology.

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Citations of this work

Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?Bert Leuridan - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):317-340.
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Science, truth, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
Economics and reality.Tony Lawson - 1997 - New York: Routledge.

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