‘That’-clauses as existential quantifiers

Analysis 64 (3):229-235 (2004)
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Abstract

Following Panaccio, 'John believes that p' is analysed as 'For some x such that x is true if and only if p, John believes x'. On this view the complement clause 'that p' acts as a restricted existential quantifier and it contributes a higher-order property.

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Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
Understanding demonstratives.Gareth Evans - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 280--304.
Belief ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.

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